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| Populism |
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| The most salient first use of the term populism and its cognates can be found in late nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia. The Russian peasant *Narodniki* of the 1860s and 1870s (*People-ism* would be an apt translation of their program of *Narodnichestvo* [*Народничество*]) supply a good beginning point. As Eric Hobsbawm has noted, the Narodnik program, which Marx’s very late work inclined toward, ‘believed that the Russian village community could provide the basis of a transition to socialism without prior disintegration through capitalist development’ (‘Introduction’ to Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations,* 49-50). Marxists of the time opposed this conflation of historical phases, but this mostly peasant and Slavophilic early populism in Russia is a telling precursor of later European and American groups who turned to notions of land, regional autonomy, and ethnic/racial bonds in the service of resistance to the deracinating effects of large-scale capitalism. Later populism was often a reaction against the liberal nation-state’s need to manage capitalism by means of an increasingly powerful and centralised administrative apparatus. This reaction, however, took several distinct paths. |
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Later populism was often a reaction against the liberal nation-state’s need to manage capitalism by means of an increasingly powerful and centralised administrative apparatus. This reaction, however, took several distinct paths.  The most powerful form of European populism arose just before and after the First World War in Germany. Evolving from *back to the land* movements prior to the war, German and Scandinavian populism took root in the wake of Germany’s humiliating military defeat, the subsequent inflation, and the effects of the Great Depression. Most commonly described as *völkisch* [popular] or *Blut und Boden* [blood and soil], this populism expressed itself in the popular peasant novels by Norwegian Knut Hamsun and German Friedrich Griese, and in the administrative (and overtly racist) social philosophy of figures such as Walther Darré, the minister for nutrition and agriculture under Hitler. While nationalist and racist, however, such agrarian populism proved to be of little use to Hitler’s emphasis on heavy industry and remilitarisation.  In the United States, the populism that arose before and after the First World War shared some of the traits of its Russian precursors, and harkened back to Andrew Jackson’s suspicions of central banking, and even further back to *The Federalist Papers.* Rallying behind William Jennings Bryan in his first run for President in 1896 on the Democratic Party ticket, the People’s Party of the 1880s and 1890s may have been the acme of left-wing American populism. Articulating the interests of farmers in the mid-West who often owed large sums of loaned capital and accrued interest to urban Eastern bankers, Bryan’s populism exploded at the 1896 convention in his impassioned ‘Cross of Gold’ speech. Arguing that the American farmer had been economically crucified by a dogmatic adherence to the *gold standard* (by which the treasury insisted that all paper money needed to be backed by gold specie), Bryan proposed *bimetallism* (the use of silver as well as gold to guarantee monetary values), the inflationary effects of which would ease agricultural debt. The most enduring left-leaning contributions of this earlier phase of populism — namely the desire to protect small farmers, anti-trust legislation, monetary reform, the surge in labour-union power under Samuel Gompers, new banking and stock market regulations after the crash of 1929, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s federal works projects in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s — were once again debated during the Great Recession of 2008-10.  During the 1930s, American populism leaned to the political right. Father Charles Coughlin, the first true radio demagogue with perhaps an audience of one third of the entire country at his peak, switched in 1934 from being a socialist-leaning champion of labour, internationalism, and the New Deal, to being an anti-Semitic and isolationist supporter of the Nazi cause. Indeed, both agrarian and labour populism were often hamstrung by the same racism permeating American society at large. The political career of Louisiana Governor (1928-32), Senator (1932-35) and potential presidential candidate Huey Long (supported by Coughlin) encapsulates much of populism’s ambiguity. Robert Penn Warren’s *All the King’s Men* (1946) is something of a fictional précis of that ambiguity in America, at least in its powerfully influential Southern guise. More recently, politicians such as George Wallace and Pat Buchanan, along with interest groups such as the NRA and the Tea Party, have carried on the legacy of right-wing populism, while Occupy movements have tried to revive its left-wing counterpoint.  Latin America has hosted a range of populist movements, from both the left and right of the political spectrum. Juan Peron in Argentina may be the most conspicuous example of South American populism, and Peron (followed by his first wife Evita and second wife Isabel) led a movement largely progressive in its achievements. At times revered, Peron supported economic equality and labour unions, instituted social security and health reforms (over a hundred hospitals were built), and strove for economic independence from the neo-colonial power of the United States. After 1949, he proposed an economic *third way* between the Cold War rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union. But Peron had earlier expressed sympathy with the syndicalism of Mussolini and the National Socialism of Hitler, where he saw the interests of the working classes and a statist nationalism firmly wedded. Worse, his nationalisation of natural resources and a number of industries, combined with the cult of personality that turned the Labour Party into the Peronist Party, unified the opposition of conservative elites and socialists alike, bringing about his downfall. Like Bryan on the left and Huey Long on the right, Peron’s case illustrates how easily populism produced charismatic figures who led as much by personality as by clearly defined policy. |
| Further reading:  (Coniff)  (Kazin)  (Postel) |